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The False Hope of Deliberate Forgetting : A
Critical Response to Proponents of Limited-Use
Memory Manipulation
Peter A. DePergola II

Abstract
The emergence of manipulation techniques that dampen, disassociate, erase, and replace unsavory episodic
memories have given pause to even the most ardent proponents of the practice. Supporters of memory
manipulation have since clarified that the interventions should be made available exclusively in extreme and
limited-use cases. In light of the narrowing of this approach, the present essay examines the arguments in
favor of limited-use memory manipulation (LUMM) for the two most commonly-cited circumstances in which
the practice is claimed to be justified: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance addiction. After
examining the neuroscience of PTSD and substance addition, the critical concepts of biomedicalization and the
codification of new diseases, the myth of global autonomy loss, and the terminal normlessness of LUMM are
explored to underscore the false hope of deliberate forgetting.
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1. The Case in Favor of LUMM for PTSD
Proponents of LUMM argue that is it morally reasonable, as a last resort, for
individuals at risk of severe PTSD to be offered prophylaxis against the condition after
enduring exceptionally traumatic and vastly disproportionate circumstances, such as
the horrors of brutal rape or the recovery of fellow comrades’ bodies (Donovan 2010).
Inasmuch as death associated with war is considered morally acceptable in particular
circumstances, and the risk of death in war is typically outweighed by any benefits to
be gleaned, proponents suggest that helping those who executed a military agenda,
risked death and dishonor, and subsequently suffer from a condition associated with their
service should be considered an ethical obligation. If it is reasonable, on the one hand, to
ask individuals to engage in life-threatening and emotionally distressing activities, then
it seems wrong, on the other hand, to deny them therapeutic medications that may
significantly reduce their considerable risk of developing PTSD. Moreover, proponents
note that objections to the preventative use of beta-blocking pharmacologicals overlook
ethical questions about post-trauma debriefing that, they maintain, has little to no effect
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and, at worst, increases the risk of PTSD (Bryant 2002). As Wayne Hall and Adrian Carter
(2007) maintain, when compared with countless hours of psychological intervention of
uncertain efficacy, a seven-day course of a low-toxicity drug seems trivial.
1.1 The Neurobiology of PTSD
Psychological trauma often results from witnessing events that are perceived
as life threatening or injurious to self or others (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011). Such
experiences, which frequently evoke intense fear, horror, and helplessness, can lead
to the development of PTSD. The condition was originally thought to represent a
normative response (at the extreme end of the response continuum) to severe trauma
or stress. However, it has become clear that the idiosyncratic response of an individual
to trauma depends not only on stressor characteristics, but also on factors specific to the
individual. For the majority of human beings, the psychological trauma induced by the
experience of profound threat is acute and transient. Psychological trauma is typically
characterized by phenomena that can be grouped into three domains: (i) reminders
of exposure (including flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, and nightmares), (ii) activation
(including hyperarousal, insomnia, agitation, irritability, impulsivity, and anger), and
(iii) deactivation (including numbing, avoidance, withdrawal, confusion, derealization,
dissociation, and depression). Self-limiting by definition, these reactions generally effect
minimal impairment over time. For a (significant) minority of the population, however,
the psychological trauma brought about by the experience of profound threat leads to a
longer-term syndrome that has been defined, validated, and termed “PTSD” in the clinical
literature. PTSD is accompanied by devastating functional impairment characterized by
the presence of signs and symptoms in the three primary domains mentioned above
(Sherin and Nemeroff 2011).
Contemporary neuroimaging has identified and confirmed characteristic changes
in brain structure and function in individuals with PTSD (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011).
Altered brain regions include the hippocampus, amygdala, anterior cingulate, insula,
and orbitofrontal region. Together, these form a neural circuit that mediates adaptation
to stress and fear conditioning. Changes in these circuits have been postulated to share
a direct link to the development of PTSD. A hallmark feature of PTSD is reduced
hippocampal volume. The hippocampus is implicated to control stress responses,
declarative memory, and contextual aspects of fear conditioning. In fMRI studies, small
hippocampal volumes were associated with trauma severity and memory impairments.
The functional role of the amygdala, which mediates stress responses and emotional
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learning, is also involved in the pathophysiology of PTSD. Given that increased amygdalar
activity has been linked to genetic traits that moderate PTSD, increased amygdala activity
may represent a neurobiological risk factor for developing PTSD. The medial prefrontal
cortext (MPFC) comprises the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), subcallosal cortex, and
medial frontal gyrus. The medial PFC exerts inhibitory control over stress responses and
emotional reactivity through its connections with the amygdala, and mediates extinction
of conditioned fear through active inhibition of acquired fear responses. Individuals with
PTSD exhibit decreased volumes of the frontal cortex, including reduced ACC volume,
which has been similarly correlated with the severity of PTSD symptoms (Sherin and
Nemeroff 2011).
The neurobiological concerns observed in individuals with PTSD are numerous and
likely reflect an enduring dysregulation of multiple stress-mediating systems that occur
as a result of psychological assault (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011). These pathophysiological
disturbances occur in individuals with genetic, epigenetic, and experiential predispositions
when exposed to extreme conditions, and presumably signify an indelible sensory imprint
of maladaptively processed experience that effects an imbalanced degree of emotional
import and releases (or restrains) behavioral reactions that aim to defend against future
trauma via activation (or deactivation) in a losing effort to secure equilibrium. Hence, a
lack of baseline cortisol at the time of psychological trauma may facilitate overactivation
in the central corticotropin-releasing hormone - norepinephrine (CRH-NE) cascade,
resulting in prolonged and enhanced stress responses. This increased stress responsiveness
may be further accented by inadequate regulatory effects of gamma-aminobutyric acid
(GABA), serotonin, and neuropeptide Y (NPY). Additionally, altered norepinephrine and
stress hormone activity may be involved in processes of learning and extinction, both
of which are abnormal in PTSD. For instance, norepinephrine enhances the encoding
of fear memories and glucocorticoids block the retrieval of emotional memories. The
constellation of elevated noradrenergic activity and relative hypocortisolism may lead
to the encoding of traumatic memories and the lack of memory retrieval inhibition,
both of which presumably trigger the re-experience of phenomena in PTSD (Sherin and
Nemeroff 2011).
Additionally, a malfunctioning hippocampus may account for some cognitive
symptoms of PTSD, including declarative memory deficits (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011).
Since the hippocampus is critical for context conditioning, an impaired hippocampus
may facilitate generalization of learned fear in contexts unrelated to previous traumatic
exposure and so impair the ability to discern between safe and unsafe stimuli. In
combination with exaggerated amygdalar responses associated with PTSD, a limited
34
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capacity to discriminate threats may promote paranoia, hypervigilance, behavioral
activation, exaggerated stress responses, and acquisition of additional fear associations.
Disrupted PFC function may then serve to further exacerbate PTSD pathology as
a result of deficient suppression of stress responses, fear associations, and extinction.
To be sure, some neurobiological findings in patients with PTSD are controversial and
require additional examination. Moreover, there are a number of understudied yet
significant topics, including factors that impact resilience and vulnerability. For instance,
stress-protective neurobiological factors such as activity in oxytocin and NPY-containing
circuits could, in principle, be altered to promote resilience. Hence, there exists a general
need for molecular biology to further explore PTSD to identify interactions between
dispositional factors (both genetic and epigenetic) and trauma exposure to understand
PTSD risk, gauge illness course, and predict treatment response. The effects of trauma
on neurotrophic factors (in the hippocampus), neural plasticity (central nervous system
[CNS]-wide), circuit remodeling (myelination patterns), and gene expression must be
assessed in detail across illness duration. While difficult, such studies will necessitate
accessing, assaying, and following populations at risk for exposure to trauma before
exposure occurs (Sherin and Nemeroff 2011).
1.2 Beta-Adrenergic Receptor-Blocking Pharmacologicals
as Treatment for PTSD
Propranolol, a beta-adrenergic receptor antagonist, is the primary pharmacological
agent examined for treatment of PTSD (Donovan 2010). 1 This centrally acting, long
chain, non-selective beta-blocker is highly protein bound and almost completely
absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract with peak concentrations occurring in one to
one and a half hours and a half life of approximately four hours (Strawn and Geracioti
2007). Preclinical studies have demonstrated that propranolol-induced beta-blockade
in the rodent amygdala blocks memory reconsolidation, suggesting that treatment
with propranolol following consolidation of traumatic events might interfere with
the amygdalar retrieval of such events and thereby ameliorate unwanted symptoms
associated with PTSD (Debiec and Ledoux 2004). Although direct antagonism of
norepinephrine signaling may relieve PTSD symptoms, it is possible that propranolol
exerts its therapeutic effect in PTSD by regulating substance P – a neuropeptide acting
as both a neurotransmitter and neuromodulator system. Like norepinephrine, this pain1.

While many beta-blocking drugs exist – including some that are more potent and prescribed more
frequently than propranolol – the majority of research in this area has employed propranolol.
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transmitting neuropeptide is tonically elevated and robustly secreted in response to acute
psychological stress in individuals with PTSD. Preclinical data suggest that substance P
can be attenuated by beta-antagonists (e.g., propranolol) but not alpha-1 and alpha-2
antagonists (e.g., prazosin). Interestingly, intrathecal administration of substance P to
anesthetized rodents induces an increased heart rate that can be blocked by propranolol.
Hence, it will be of significant future interest to determine if neurokinin-1 receptor
antagonists (i.e., substance P antagonists) prove to be of clinical benefit to PTSD patients
(Strawn and Geracioti 2007).
Current PTSD research has employed propranolol in three phases of memory: (i)
acquisition, formation, and encoding, (ii) emotional response and consolidation, and (iii)
retrieval and consolidation (Donovan 2010). If an event is anticipated as stressful, such
as responding to a disaster, the administration of propranolol would influence formation,
acquisition, and encoding. Administration immediately following a traumatic event
– rape, for instance – would influence response and consolidation. Administration at a
later point – for instance, during simulated arousal of PTSD in those who have been
diagnosed – may influence recall, retrieval, and reconsolidation. The beta-adrenergic
system is involved not only with response and memory formation, but also with the
conditioning of emotional responses associated with memory. Hence, propranolol may
both dampen memory formation and strip memories of their associated emotional
responses. While this treatment has been termed “therapeutic forgetting” (Kolber 2007),
it is not designed to make individuals forget physical experiences but rather dissociate
emotions and fears from particular memories. Insofar as they slow heart rate and inhibit
arterial vasoconstriction, beta-blockers have been administered for years as treatment
for hypertension and cardiovascular disease. Although propranolol can interfere with
hippocampal centers involved in memory storage – including dampening memory of
trauma and enhancing memory of the events preceding it – there have been no reported
cases of severe memory loss due to propranolol for cardiovascular conditions (Donovan
2010).
Michael Henry and colleagues (2007) cite multiple studies in which subjects were
randomly given propranolol or placebo before exposure to both tragic and emotional
stories and neutral and uneventful stories. When subjects were asked to recollect the
stories, the placebo group recalled significantly more of the emotional story than the
propranolol subjects. Further, there was no difference between the propranolol and
placebo groups in recall of the neutral story. Christopher Reist and colleagues (2004)
studied thirty-seven subjects who received oral doses of either forty milligrams of
propranolol or placebo sixty to ninety minutes before stimulus exposure. The stimulus
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was comprised of eleven slides that delineated a brief story. In the mundane version,
a young boy witnessed a car accident en route to the hospital to visit his father. Upon
arrival, the hospital staff was practicing an emergency drill. In the emotionally-charged
version, the boy himself was injured in the car accident and sent to the hospital, where
physicians worked to reattach his severed legs. Seven days post exposure, subjects were
asked to recall the specific details of the slides they viewed and to take a seventy-sixquestion multiple-choice test that examined memory recollection. Reist and colleagues
concluded that propranolol had a significant effect on attenuating memory in subjects
who viewed the emotionally-laden story. Additionally, the heart rates of subjects who
consumed propranolol were significantly lower than their placebo counterparts. If
heart rate is considered a proxy for adrenergic activation, these results substantiate the
likelihood that overactivation contributed to PTSD development through disrupted
memory consolidation (Reist et al. 2004).
The foregoing data suggest that individuals in the fire, law enforcement, military,
and rescue field may benefit from receiving propranolol prior to traumatic stimulus
(Henry et al. 2007). However, it is more likely that propranolol would be used in hospital
emergency departments to treat patients seeking medical attention shortly after assault,
abuse, rape, molestation, or involvement in any sort of accident that may induce severe
psychological trauma. Preliminary empirical studies in actual emergency situations have
demonstrated the efficacy of propranolol in reducing PTSD symptoms. Roger Pitman and
colleagues (2002) studied forty-one emergency department patients who experienced
trauma likely to trigger PTSD. Within six hours of the traumatic occurrence, subjects
were treated orally with forty milligrams of propranolol; the dose was repeated four
times daily for ten days, with a nine-day taper period. After four weeks, symptoms of
PTSD were detected in thirty percent of subjects given placebo and eighteen percent of
subjects given propranolol. A similar clinical study by Guillaume Vaiva and colleagues
(2003) of nineteen subjects demonstrated that thirty-seven and a half percent of those
who refused propranolol had PTSD symptoms in contrast to nine percent of those who
accepted it. Subjects were treated orally with forty milligrams of propranolol three times
daily for seven days, with a twelve-day taper period. Prolonged adrenergic activation,
as reflected by greater peritraumatic tachycardia, was prospectively shown to increase
the risk for PTSD insofar as these states enhance fear conditioning mechanisms and
the overconsolidation of memories related to traumatic events. This suggests that
administering propranolol to young, healthy individuals with tachycardia is effective in
mitigating PTSD symptoms and (possibly) preventing PTSD (Vaiva et al. 2003).
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1.3 The Case in Favor of LUMM for PTSD
PTSD is a growing cause of human suffering that affects approximately onethird of all individuals exposed to major trauma (Hall and Carter 2007). Conventional
psychological and pharmacological treatments for PTSD are often expensive, timeconsuming, and of modest efficacy. On this basis, LUMM proponents argue that
propranolol may be used, in extreme cases, to reduce the severity of psychological
reactions to trauma and thereby reduce the risks of developing PTSD. While reasonable
concerns have been raised about the use of drugs to alter memory, many (i) are based
on wildly exaggerated and unrealistic scenarios that ignore the restricted and fleeting
action of propranolol in affecting memory, (ii) underplay the utterly debilitating impact
that PTSD has on those who suffer from it, and (iii) fail to acknowledge fully the extent
to which other drugs – such as alcohol – are already used for this purpose. Anterograde
amnesia is a well-known side effect of alcohol, as well as benzodiazepines available by
prescription, such as Valium and Halcion, and illegally obtained benzodiazepines, such
as Rophypnol. Unlike these drugs, propranolol has a retrograde amnesic effect, offering
greater potential to ameliorate traumatic memories from the recent past (Kolber 2006).
Henry and colleagues offer a scathing critique of the ethical concerns forwarded by the
2003 President’s Council on Bioethics (PCB) about the prophylactic and dampening
use of propranolol. The authors comment that the PCB’s concerns involve a series of
speculative harms – for instance, that criminals may consume beta-blockers to reduce
painful memories of their crimes – that fail to provide concrete reasons to oppose trials
to assess the safety and effectiveness of propranolol. Moreover, the PCB also fails, in their
judgment, to make a persuasive case for proscribing the clinical use of propranolol if
clinical trials indicate its effectiveness (Henry et al. 2007).
Wayne Hall and Adrian Carter (2007) expand the arguments of Henry and colleagues
(2007) to articulate more broadly what is at stake, thereby forwarding the strongest
(available) case in favor of LUMM for PTSD. The authors offer a consequentialist
argument in favor of using propranolol – namely, that it may be employed to reduce
the need for PTSD sufferers to use a more hazardous drug (e.g., alcohol) to treat their
symptoms. In high doses, alcohol reduces anxiety and recall of emotionally traumatic
memories, but chronic use for these purposes can quickly lead to dependence, a disorder
that significantly reduces the chance of recovering from PTSD and has enormous health
consequences, both individually and socially (Hall and Carter 2007). Following Henry and
colleagues, the authors similarly reject the argument of the 2003 PCB that propranolol
may be used by criminals to reduce regretful memories of their crimes, arguing instead
that psychopaths cannot express interest in reducing the sting of such memories insofar
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as they do not possess the emotional capacity for regret. Nonetheless, in the unlikely
event that criminals used propranolol to numb their conscience, a positive outcome
might include reduced alcohol abuse,2 improved public order, and reduced burden on
the families of criminals. Hall and Carter further suggest that concerns about propranolol
being used by the military to prevent soldiers from developing painful memories of
war crimes and atrocities do not reflect the pharmacological properties of propranolol,
which serves to attenuate reactions to trauma rather than procure global amnesia of
events and conscience. Somewhat ironically, they mention that atrocities such as those at
Srebrenica, Vietnam, and in World War II did not depend on the use of beta-adrenergic
antagonists,3 suggesting that the psychology of war appears sufficient to account for
such acts attracting strong and justified societal opprobrium in the unlikely event that
perpetrators of atrocities use propranolol for these means (Hall and Carter 2007).
In response to the medico-legal argument that damages payouts may be reduced
by the effects of propranolol, Hall and Carter comment that this merely signifies the
perverse incentives in the legal system rather than a compelling argument against
the use of propranolol by victims of traumatic crimes to reduce the severity of PTSD
(Hall and Carter 2007). This concern also seems exaggerated, they note, inasmuch as
criminal actions that traumatize can be corroborated in ways that do not depend on the
memory of the victim or the severity of the PTSD symptoms subsequently developed.
For instance, no legal system would acquit a rapist on grounds that the victim did not
develop PTSD. Nevertheless, some studies suggest that propranolol may actually improve
recall of memories that are impaired by trauma (Strange et al. 2003). Further, Hall
and Carter remark that bioethicists who object to the preventative use of propranolol
overlook moral questions about the genuine efficacy of post-trauma debriefing, which
is purported to reduce the risk of PTSD. According to Richard Bryant, contemporary
evidence suggests that, at best, debriefing has no effect and, at worst, increases the
risk of PTSD (Bryant 2002). Compared to countless hours of psychological intervention
of uncertain efficacy, the authors argue that a seven-day course of a low-toxicity drug
seems trivial. Moreover, the use of propranolol to prevent the consolidation of traumatic
episodic memories seems a risk worth taking in order to avoid a thirty-three percent
chance of spending months undergoing psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy to treat

2.

Alcohol is the overwhelming drug of choice for criminal offenders.

3.

Ironically, this point may be used a foundation on which their argument may be refuted.
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PTSD and the common complications of alcohol and other drug dependence (Hall and
Carter 2007).
While Hall and Carter (2007) sympathize with the concerns of Henry and colleagues
(2007) regarding the potential for over-promotion of drugs to treat PTSD, they make
two observational points in reply. First, they argue that propranolol is already off patent,
which makes it exceedingly unlikely to be promoted by any drug company. Second, they
argue that while it is plausible that the production of new drugs with similar effects may
be promoted in this way in the United States – where direct-to-consumer advertising of
pharmaceuticals is allowed and there are few regulatory limits to prevent superfluous
promotion – this possibility simply denotes the need for improved regulation of the
pharmaceutical industry rather than a robust argument against the use of propranolol
per se. In conclusion, they reiterate that most of the commonly raised ethical objections
to the use of memory dampening drugs, including propranolol, overstate the possible
negative consequences of its use and run the risk of hindering a promising advance in the
prevention of PTSD that may significantly reduce the need for PTSD suffers to turn to
more harmful drugs, such as alcohol. Moreover, the authors reinforce that conventional
arguments against the use of propranolol fail to provide cogent reasons for either
preventing a trial of its safety and efficacy or for preventing its clinical use once proven
to be safe and effective. For Hall and Carter, then, the criticisms of the PCB should be
recognized only as a form of scare-mongering: a hazard of bioethical analyses that is the
product of “worst-casing” the potential harms of new biotechnologies, often as a result of
exaggerating their effectiveness (Hall and Carter 2007).
2. The Case in Favor of LUMM for Substance Addiction
Proponents of LUMM argue that it is morally permissible, as a last resort, for
substance addicts whose psychosocial condition poses a disproportionate and immediate
threat to their overall health, well-being, and safety to be offered relief in the form of
surgical or psychological memory editing. Impaired control over voluntary behavior is
a marked feature in emerging neurobiological explanations of substance addiction, in
clinical and diagnostic accounts, and in debates about addiction nosology (Wild et al.
2012). Hence, drug cravings can manifest as such irresistible and powerful psychological
forces that someone with an addiction is not capable, at certain times, of acting fully
autonomously when the decision involves denying the persistence of cravings. An addict
might be excessively subservient to the individual who supplies him with drugs, or with
money for drugs, and therefore have his autonomy compromised by the rule of another.
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However, if the addict’s autonomy is compromised in this way, it marks a consequence of
an initial loss of autonomy that is characteristic of addiction (Wild et al. 2012). It follows,
therefore, that such a loss of autonomy undercuts the addict’s ability to pursue his own
goals (Levy 2012).
2.1 The Neurobiology of Substance Addiction
Communication in the brain is facilitated by neurotransmitters that are released
from neurons at synapses where they interact as bonds with protein complexes, called
receptors, on the surface of other cells, predominantly at the postsynaptic membrane
(Duncan and Lawrence 2012). The binding of a neurotransmitter to a receptor transduces
a chemical signal that transfers activity-dependent information. The neurotransmitters
can either be taken back up by the cell for future use by transporters or degraded and
removed from the system. In the brain, pathways are complex integrative systems that
contain numerous neurons or nuclei that relay information throughout a circuit and can
be acted upon by other neurotransmitter systems that also integrate with that region.
While addictive substances have diverse pharmacological profiles, their acute actions
converge primarily on the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system. This pathway
originates in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and projects to the nucleus accumbens
(NAc), striatum, forebrain, and PFC. The PFC coordinates cognitive processes and
actions aimed at an internal goal, while the NAc is believed to integrate information,
effect an appropriate response, and control the motivational value of stimuli and reward
enforcement. Immediately after initial exposure to a drug, extracellular levels of accumbal
dopamine increase. Some enhance dopamine release from the presynaptic terminals as a
consequence of increased neuronal activity in the VTA (e.g., alcohol, nicotine, opiates,
and cannabis) while others inhibit the presynaptic uptake by the dopamine transporter
in the NAc (e.g., cocaine and amphetamines). Addictive substances produce a larger
dopamine release that is maintained for longer than that of natural rewards. If exposure
to the drug persists, there may be a loss of homeostatic regulation: a progressive increase
in basal levels of dopamine is accompanied by a reduction in the lesser response to the
drug, resulting in the appearance of tolerance to the drug (Duncan and Lawrence 2012).
During acute withdrawal, dopamine rebounds to below basal levels so re-exposure
to the drug or a drug-related cue is often sufficient to increase dopamine again (Duncan
and Lawrence 2012). This dopamine response has been hypothesized to contribute to
addictive relapse, working on serotonergic, noradrenic, glutamatergic, and GABAergic
systems. While dopamine release may modulate the acute rewarding effects of an
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addictive substance, it does not solely mediate drug-seeking behaviors and persistent
drug taking. Exposure to addictive drugs can have either a direct or indirect effect on
numerous neurotransmitter systems. Unlike dopamine, which facilitates the response
to initial drug use, these additional neurotransmitter systems play a greater role in
mediating persistent drug use, contributing to the inability to terminate drug use and
the likelihood of relapse after a period of abstinence. Glutamatergic inputs from the PFC,
amygdala, hippocampus, and other brain regions modulate activity in the NAc either
directly or indirectly by their influence on the VTA. Like to dopamine, initial exposure to
a psychostimulant increases extracellular levels of glutamate in the NAc, PFC, and, to a
lesser extent, the VTA. Unlike dopamine, however, this response increases the sensitivity
of the receptors that bind glutamate to the effects of subsequent exposures to lower
doses of the particular drug. This leads to reduced extracellular glutamate levels and,
hence, decreased glutamate-driven activity over time. Upon re-exposure to the drug or
drug-associated cue, there is enhanced synaptic glutamate release that drives continued
drug-seeking behaviors. Such dysregulation of the glutamatergic system is sufficient to
alter drug-induced behaviors, even in light of normal dopaminergic responses procured
in the NAc (Duncan and Lawrence 2012).
Imbalance in the glutamatergic regulation of corticostriatal transmission has been
termed the “glutamate hypothesis” of addiction, which suggests its cardinal role in
mediating relapse (Duncan and Lawrence 2012). This hypothesis is supported by studies
demonstrating that the reinstatement of drug-seeking behaviors can be prevented
using the procysteine drug N-acetylcysteine (NAC) (Reichel et al. 2011). NAC increases
glutathione synthesis, which restores glutamatergic signaling. Treatment with NAC is
also able to restore prefrontal-driven long-term potentiation and long-term depression
in the NAc, which are typically impaired during acute withdrawal. The therapeutic
potential of NAC has now been trialed in preclinical human studies, where it has
successfully reduced the desire to use drugs of abuse (Gray et al. 2010). Astrocytes
express the sodium-dependent GLT1, which is responsible for removing over ninety
percent of glutamate from the extracellular space. Overexpression of GLT1 in the PFC
and the NAc during extinction training is sufficient to inhibit cue-induced reinstatement
to drug self-administration by suppressing the excess extracellular glutamate that
normally occurs upon re-exposure to a drug. Beyond relapse, imbalances in glutamatergic
transmission have been hypothesized to mediate responses to drugs including selfadministration, reward learning, extinction, and behavioral sensitization that, in animal
subjects, is manifested by increased psychomotor activity. In the NAc, the modulation of
glutamatergic inputs onto medium spiny GABAergic neurons expressing D1 dopamine
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receptors play a vital role in the development of sensitization to drugs. Thus, an allostatic
shift – which marks an adaptive effort in a regulatory system in response to a chronic
deviation from “normal,” thereby establishing a new set-point – toward augmented
glutamatergic function may contribute to the transition from controlled drug use to a
compulsive and uncontrolled drug-dependent state and the high incidence of relapse
(Duncan and Lawrence 2012).
There are vast numbers of neuropeptides and corresponding receptors present in
pathways that mediate addiction. The role of corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) is
highlighted as an example of the intricate part that neuropeptides play in mediating
addictive behaviors (Duncan and Lawrence 2012). Stress, either in the environment
or due to substance withdrawal, can induce drug craving, which leads to relapse.
The system mediating stress responses incorporates the HPA and extrahypothalamic
regions (such as the extended amygdala). CRF is a neuropeptide that is responsible for
activating the HPA, where it plays a mediating role in hormonal, autonomic, emotional,
and behavioral responses to stress. Initial exposure to a drug engages the HPA, but this
response becomes blunted with repeated exposures via feedback systems in response
to circulating hormones. CFR-mediated actions on addictive behaviors depend on their
interplay at extrahypothalamic sites. These extrahypothalamic regions become sensitized
to CRF after repeated exposure to substance abuse. During withdrawal, these regions
become engaged and hyperactive, thereby increasing local CRF levels and perpetuating
negative states of stress. While stress is sufficient to increase CRF levels in the VTA, it is
neuroadaptive changes induced by prior drug abuse that enable the CRF to control local
glutamate release, subsequently activating the dopaminergic system and perpetuating
stress-induced relapse to drug-seeking behaviors. There remains debate about the
particular sites of action for CRF beyond the HPA. CRF acts primarily through either
CRF1 or CRF2 receptors, both of which are widely distributed throughout the brain. CRF1
receptors have been hypothesized to play a significant role in addiction sensitization and
relapse. One study suggests that a CRF1 receptor antagonist was sufficient to decrease
the reinstatement of drug-seeking behavior in a previously abstinent rodent that was
given cocaine (Przegaliński et al. 2005), although more recent studies support the role
of CRF1 receptors in active drug taking (Specio et al. 2008). Chronic inhibition of CRF1
receptors is also sufficient to induce long-term adaptations to the dopaminergic system,
including reducing the density of dopaminergic projections in the striatum and increasing
dopamine receptor expression in a subtype-specific manner. Comparatively, stress-induced
reinstatement to addictive substances can be prevented by infusions of a CRF2 receptor
antagonist into the VTA. This most likely indicates inhibition of glutamate and dopamine
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release, even through CRF1 receptors are dominant in this region (Duncan and Lawrence
2012).
2.2 Deep Brain Stimulation and False Memory Creation
as Treatments for Substance Addiction
DBS is a surgical procedure in which an electrode is implanted in one or more
specific areas of the brain and high-frequency electrical stimulation (130-180 Hz) is
delivered to target sites (Henderson et al. 2010). This procedure ameliorates symptoms
associated with movement disorders and has been moderately effective for intractable
pain. The use of DBS is now being extended to include a variety of psychiatric disorders,
including obsessive-compulsive disorder and depression. The NAc has a pivotal
role in the pathogenesis of substance addiction and is an important element in the
mesocorticolimbic reward circuit. As such, it is immediately involved in establishing the
reward of drugs of abuse. Numerous researchers now contend that dysregulation of the
neurophysiological processes involved in creating the quality or intensity of rewarding
experiences contributes to addiction. For these reasons, the NAc is an ideal target for
DBS, and early studies have shown promise. DBS in the NAc has selectively blocked
the return of psychostimulant use and reduced morphine-induced place preference. For
one individual who received DBS to alleviate anxiety and depression, stimulation in the
NAc had the unintended consequence of improving the individual’s comorbid alcohol
dependence (Kuhn et al. 2007). Data from a subsequent animal study indicated brief
periods of DBS in either the core or shell of the NAc reduced alcohol consumption in
rats trained to drink alcohol. The purpose of the study was to indicate the potential of
DBS to reduce human alcohol preference and its deprivation effect. This occurred with
no sucrose fading or any other behavioral modification to induce alcohol consumption.
Hence, DBS may serve as a solitary or adjunctive therapy for individuals resistant to
current treatments for substance addiction (Henderson et al. 2010).
Drug aversion therapies have historically included electroconvulsive techniques (in
which an electric shock is used as a negative stimulus pairing when the individual is
engaged in thoughts, urges, or behaviors related to the addictive substance), satiation
(a technique primarily used with cigarette smokers whereby individuals smoke a
large number of cigarettes in a short period of time to induce nicotine toxicity), and
chemical aversant pairings (in which a repugnant smell or taste, or even an intravenous
pharmacological agent, is administered to induce sickness) (Clifasefi 2013). Ethical
concerns, as well as a lack of controlled scientific studies in these areas, have led to the
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demise of conventional aversion techniques. Nevertheless, some drug programs still
integrate aversion therapy in their methodologies. Current (acceptable) pharmacological
treatments for substance addiction include the administration of inhibitory agents
(e.g., Disulfiram) that act by blocking the breakdown of acetaldehyde, the chemical
believed to contribute to withdrawal symptoms. The interaction of Disulfiram with any
amount of an addictive substance enhances unpleasant physical symptoms – including
throbbing headache, nausea, vomiting, and weakness – deterring the individual from
subsequent use. Today, an alternate approach to curbing substance addiction can be
found in the pseudomemory literature. Over the past twenty years, the literature on FMC
has suggested the possibility of having individuals imagine an event that purportedly
happened in their past through innocuous suggestions and eventually believing (with
confidence) that the event occurred (Clifasefi et al. 2013).
Results from a handful of FMC studies have indicated that adopting false memories
as part of one’s personal autobiography can affect an individual’s current and future
preferences related to those memories (Clifasefi et al. 2013). These findings demonstrate
promise for related behaviors that carry devastating health risks, such as substance
addiction. To date, only one study has experimentally examined whether early substancerelated memories would be prone to memory manipulation. Seema Clifasefi and
colleagues (2013) suggested to their trial participants that they had become sick during
their early teenage years (prior to age sixteen) after exposure to a particular type of
drug, and examined whether they would (i) increase their confidence that the suggested
event occurred and, if so, (ii) demonstrate a decreased preference for the specific drug
mentioned. Overall, experimental participants who received a false substance-related
suggestion exhibited a significant increase in confidence compared to controls that the
event did occur. More significantly, individuals who received a false suggestion that they
had become sick from a particular drug showed a trend toward diminished preference
for the drug in a follow-up preference rating task. Taken together, false memories about
becoming sick from a specific drug in one’s young adulthood appears to have implications
for an individual’s current and future associations with that drug. The findings of Clifasefi
and colleagues are consistent with the drug expectancy literature, which indicates that
positive drug expectancies are associated with increased and risky drug-related behavior,
whereas negative drug expectancies are associated with decreased drug-related behavior
(Clifasefi et al. 2013).
To be sure, the 2013 study by Clifasefi and colleagues is not without limitations,
five of which are particularly worthy of note. First, it is important to illuminate that
only 19.6 percent of experimental subjects developed a memory or belief that the drug45
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related memory occurred. Second, the fact that disparities existed between experimental
and control participants at baseline vis-à-vis drug preference does not preclude the
possibility that preference findings are due to regression to the mean. Third, the data
suggests that those who reported a younger first drug-related experience were more
likely to adopt the false suggestion. Fourth, it can be argued that insofar as early onset
drug users are known to be at higher risk for subsequent problems, these individuals may
ultimately be remembering true events from their past. Finally, another argument can
be made about early age-of-onset drug use – namely, that these individuals might show
different cognitive vulnerabilities than their late(r) age-of-onset counterparts. These
limitations notwithstanding, the foregoing data suggests that, in some cases, preference
for a particular drug may be altered via FMC. Thus, drug-related memories evoked
about one’s past (whether true or false) have particular consequences for one’s current
thoughts, preferences, and, ultimately, drug-seeking behavior. Moreover, the finding
that individuals who reported a younger first drug experience were more likely to adopt
the false suggestion may be of particular interest to addiction researchers given what
is known about the connections between age of first drug experience and subsequent
development of drug dependence. Ralph Hingson and colleagues (2006), for instance,
have demonstrated that individuals who were exposed to an addictive substance prior
to age fourteen are approximately five times more likely to experience dependence
compared to those exposed at age twenty-one or older. In a similar vein, the study of
Clifasefi and colleagues highlights additional cognitive characteristics of individuals who
may be at risk for developing drug problems (Clifasefi et al. 2013).
2.3 The Case in Favor of LUMM for Substance Addiction
Addictive behaviors clearly undermine individual and population health and exact
a significant economic cost on global societies (Wild et al. 2012). Clinicians, researchers,
policy makers, and society at large are therefore eager to implement effective policies and
programs to reduce the medical and economic burdens of addiction. Treatment is one
important response to these burdens. Addiction treatment programs have traditionally
engendered the view that patients are sufficiently impaired and concerned by their
addictions to seek help voluntarily. However, the case-mix has shifted dramatically over
time, and mandatory treatment pathways are becoming increasingly entrenched in
addiction treatment programs and policies around the world. These pathways include
legal mandates from the criminal justice system, formal mandates from employers
and social assistance agencies, and informal mandates (e.g., threats, ultimatums,
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interventions, etc.) issued by family and friends, all compelling individuals with addiction
to seek treatment. Mandated treatment policies and programs have been viewed as costeffective and rehabilitative adjuncts to voluntary treatment and, on this basis, justifiable
public health measures similar to seatbelt laws or mass immunization programs. The
rationale for mandatory addiction treatment has recently been broadened to underscore
findings from neuroscience research. Evidence of impairment in decision making and
behavioral control in individuals with histories of substance abuse has been used to argue
that individuals with such neurocognitive affliction are not capable of informed consent.
Some scholars have expanded this argument by proposing that mandated addiction
treatment should be used to restore patient autonomy and, to this end, can be justified
according to a fundamentally humanitarian moral calculus (Wild et al. 2012).
Impaired control over voluntary behavior is a marked feature in emerging
neurobiological explanations of substance addiction, in clinical and diagnostic accounts,
and in debates about addiction nosology (Wild et al. 2012). There is growing evidence
that chronic, sustained drug abuse is associated with neurocognitive changes and deficits,
as revealed by neuroimaging studies (Bolla et al. 2003) and neuropsychological testing
(Ersche and Sahakian 2007). Several studies propose that chronic exposure to drugs sets
in motion neurobiological processes that result in overvaluing the reinforcing properties
of a substance or behavior and an undervaluing of natural reinforcers (e.g., maintaining
relationships, going to work, etc.) (Goldstein and Volkow 2002). These processes are
associated with impaired voluntary control over one’s behavior. Similarly, individuals
experiencing addiction have neurological impairments that weaken their ability to make
voluntary decisions in service of long-term outcomes. Despite cautionary assertions
concerning the difficulty of making substantive generalizations or conclusions about
the neuropsychological and neurobiological correlates of chronic drug use – due largely
to the fact that findings are not always consistent in the nature or extent of deficits
observed – results from neuroscientific studies have been used to argue that treatment
is able to restore free will (Caplan 2008). This suggests that drug cravings can manifest
as such irresistible and powerful psychological forces that someone with an addiction is
not capable, at certain times, of acting fully autonomously when the decision involves
denying the persistence of cravings (Wild et al. 2012).
Autonomy is a term with multiple meanings. In its maximal sense, autonomy means
that human beings possess only the desires and beliefs they want to have and make
choices uninfluenced by any factor they have not endorsed (Levy 2012). Certainly, if
addiction threatens autonomy (as it seems to do), then it must be some less extravagant
notion of autonomy that it undermines. In a minimal sense, autonomy is simply self47
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government. Just as autonomous nations are able to make major decisions of internal and
external policy without undue interference from foreign powers, so autonomous persons
are capable of governing themselves by setting their own short- and long-term ends and
choosing the best means of achieving them. One obvious situation in which autonomy
is compromised or lost is when the self is ruled by another. In the political domain, the
loss of autonomy is almost exclusively described this way. The same kind of phenomenon
can occur, more or less dramatically, in the substance addict as well. A slave, for instance,
whose life is entirely in the hands of another, is a dramatic example of this phenomenon,
while a dispositionally subservient person might represent a less dramatic instance of this
partial loss of autonomy. An addict might be excessively subservient to the individual
who supplies him with drugs, or with money for drugs, and therefore have his autonomy
compromised by the rule of another. However, if the addict’s autonomy is compromised
in this way, it marks a consequence of an initial loss of autonomy that is characteristic of
addiction. This initial loss of autonomy has left the addict vulnerable to this subservience,
since it is the addiction that gives the individual who controls him undue influence (Levy
2012).
There need not be another party exercising undue influence over the addict to
experience a weakening of autonomy. The individual who is able to supply his habit is
unlikely to be at the control of another as the consequence of addiction (Levy 2012). It
is sometimes postulated that addicts are controlled by the drugs they abuse. Carl Elliot
(2002), for instance, writes that the addict must go where addiction leads, because
the addiction “holds the leash” (p. 48). Elliot’s imagery is, of course, a metaphor: an
addiction cannot hold a leash, is not an agent, and has no desires or goals of its own. If
addiction involves the loss of autonomy, then it must somehow undercut the addict’s
ability to pursue his own goals. Elliott’s claim that addicts are in thrall to their addiction
echoes a long tradition of theorizing about addiction – namely, that addiction exercises
complete control over drug-seeking and consuming behavior – found in the writings
of philosophers, psychologists, and clinicians. For Louis Charland (2002), for instance,
the addicted brain “has almost literally been hijacked by the drug” (p. 43); for Alan
Leshner (1999), the initially voluntary behavior of drug-taking gradually transforms
into involuntary drug-taking to the point where behavior is subsequently driven by
compulsive cravings for the drug; and for Harry Frankfurt (1971), unwilling addicts
struggle against their desires to no avail insofar as they are always “helplessly violated by
their own desires” (p. 12). For these authors, addiction is compulsive, which is to say that
addicts are forced to act as they do by virtue of an irresistible desire. Desires are irresistible
when they become powerful enough to overwhelm an individual’s capacity to overcome
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or circumvent them. Thus, addiction is compulsive inasmuch as it produces desires that
are so powerful that an addict cannot resist them (Levy 2012). This conception of how
addiction functions dates back (at least) to William James (1890), who commented that
“‘if a bottle of brandy stood at one hand and the pit of hell yawned at the other, and I
were convinced that I should be pushed in as sure as I took one glass, I could not refrain’”
(ch. XXVI).
3. The Neuroethical Astigmatism of LUMM
Beta-blocking pharmacologicals, DBS, and FMC techniques used to block (i.e.,
blunt or dampen) or reverse (i.e., erase) the cognitive processes through which nonconscious recollections of past events deemed pathological and found to exacerbate
PTSD and substance addiction are currently offered as treatments for specific diseases
of mentality. Intended as prudent therapies, these treatments are widely experimental
in the context of targeted manipulation and therefore transcend the respective purposes
for which they were originally designed. Due to the experimental nature of their
implementation, the long-term effects of their novel application are widely unknown.
While the potentially harmful neurocognitive and more general biological effects already
suggest their restriction from general use, this essay contends, for reasons beyond these
implications, that even the most limited forms of neurocognitive manipulation cannot be
justified as a morally licit biomedical practice, and that arguments in its favor are acutely
neuroethically astigmatic.
3.1 The Astigmatism of LUMM for PTSD:
Biomedicalization and the Codification of New Diseases
The primary neuroethical astigmatism of LUMM as a treatment for PTSD concerns
the potential for unsavory memories to become medicalized and subsequently codified as
a new disease category. A lingering effect of contemporary biomedical technologies is the
medicalization of what has heretofore been considered “normal” states of being (Henry et
al. 2007). Sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s defined medicalization as descriptive of at
least two processes: first, placing what had previously been considered “normal” behavior
under the medical gaze (Parsons 1979), and second, taking something deemed by society
as pathological and placing it under the jurisdiction of medicine (Conrad and Schneider
1980). In recent years, new processes of biomedicalization have expanded the diagnostic
conditions of illness to include more symptoms and greater numbers of individuals. This
expansion is exemplified by cases of clinical depression and bipolar disorder, and it is
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particularly evident in the extension of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
to include greater numbers of children and a growing adult population. The expansion
of diagnoses is encouraged and promoted by pharmaceutical companies that produce
drugs to treat disorders with the intention of codifying new disease categories. In turn,
pharmaceutical companies sponsor disease awareness campaigns, advertise prescription
drugs directly to consumers, and target clinicians at educational conferences and in
medical offices to encourage them to prescribe their drugs. Sometimes referred to as
“disease mongering” (Moynihan and Henry 2006), this newer process of medicalization
allows pharmaceutical companies to capitalize on human suffering and exploit insecurities
and unhappiness in order to increase drug sales (Henry et al. 2007).
Propranolol in particular seems especially ripe for pharmaceutical rebranding (Henry
et al. 2007). A pharmaceutical company that wishes to manufacture and market a newer
beta-blocker for the treatment of PTSD need only slightly alter its chemical composition
to obtain a new patent and market the drug under a new name. It might, for example,
promise fewer side effects, or longer-lasting effects than generic propranolol. The
company responsible would then be able to brand the “new” (and likely more expensive)
drug and market it with a new patent for the “new” ability to prevent PTSD. Granted this,
various scenarios become possible. For instance, patients would be made aware of and
offered the drug in the aftermath of a traumatic event. To sell more drugs, the company
would specify a range of traumatic events for which its drug should be prescribed: rape,
violent crimes, death of a loved one, and the like. Here, medicalization processes come
into play. Trauma – its conception, parameters, and definition – is equal parts cultural
and social, not medical. Yet the definition of trauma would be codified by the FDA
through its indications for use of the new drug, and the pharmaceutical company that
manufactures it may continually broaden the scope of trauma in order to sell more of its
product. Take, for example, a drug advertisement in which an individual is encouraged
to ingest propranolol following an embarrassing or humiliating experience at the office.
This quixotic yet sobering example provides a substantive reason to be concerned that
a private company seeking to sell more drugs will promote an expanded set of PTSD
causes, altering both a sense of the illness and interpretations of the experiences that may
cause it (Henry et al. 2007).
Moreover, the foregoing concern seems particularly acute in terms of employing the
new drug as a prophylactic to trauma. Although the PCB (2003) has focused chiefly
on the preventative uses of propranolol for military or emergency rescue teams, the
company producing a new drug for PTSD would presumably attempt to market directly
to consumers (Henry et al. 2007). Assuming the FDA approves the drug for this use,
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questions are inevitably raised over the breadth and depth of traumas for which the
new drug is appropriate. This essentially social question would then become defined
primarily by the pharmaceutical company. If the new drug is marketed as prophylactic,
it would be advertised to consumers who may be exposed to trauma in the near future.
It may eventually become tempting for all individuals to have the new drug on hand
for consumption before or after trauma, idiosyncratically defined. Falling in line with
methylphenidate for ADHD and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors for depression
diagnoses, propranolol may be positioned as another catalyst of “diagnostic bracket
creep” (Kramer 1993, 15), in which the availability of a new drug encourages the
expansion of a diagnostic category. This is complicated further by the added nebulous
category of “prevention” rather than treatment where the potential for expansion is even
greater. If modern history has demonstrated anything, it is that scientific breakthroughs
are often double-edged swords. However, if the PCB’s language of “evildoers” and “pain”
that is “deserved” has resonance at all in high political circles, it has little utility in the
scientific and rational evaluation of new medical technologies and their potential dangers
(Henry et al. 2007).
In addition to ethical qualms about biomedicalization and the codification of new
diseases is the issue of capacity and, thus, informed consent (Henry et al. 2007). It is
hardly controversial to question the capacity of research subjects or medical patients
to give informed consent in the immediate aftermath of severe psychic trauma. While
victims of rape and witnesses to murder are generally assumed to have decisional
capacity to accept diagnostic and forensic tests (as well as psychotherapeutic and
psychopharmacologic interventions), the use of propranolol as a targeted method of
manipulation would require healthcare professionals to accept a lower threshold of
capacity. However, researchers or clinicians utilizing this method must take decisional
capacity seriously if they wish to maintain minimal treatment standards. If an individual
is judged to be devoid of the ability to understand, evaluate, and reason about
relevant information (whatever the cause), then this precludes the individual from free
participation in PTSD research. No risk, however small, should be imposed in these
circumstances. The prevention of PTSD with propranolol does not constitute a medical
emergency as it has been traditionally defined – that is, when the consequence of
withholding a particular treatment is that death will ensue, or the patient’s health will be
substantially compromised. If, on the contrary, the prevention of PTSD were to become
understood as an emergent circumstance (as defined above), then patients with capacity
who refuse propranolol or whose surrogates consent for them would be physically forced
or psychologically coerced into taking the drug against their will. In addition to this being
51

Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics
an unjustifiable form of paternalism, such forceful and counterintuitive behavior would
likely place an additional psychic burden on an already vulnerable person (Henry et al.
2007).
3.2 The Astigmatism of LUMM for Substance Addiction:
The Myth of Global Autonomy Loss
The primary neuroethical astigmatism of LUMM as a treatment for substance
addiction concerns the myth that individuals with addiction suffer a global loss of
autonomy that renders them incapable of acting freely. Notwithstanding its popular
appeal, this characterization of addiction seems to be false (Levy 2012). While
addiction undoubtedly produces powerful desires, there is ample data to suggest that
it is not strong enough to overwhelm individuals in the aforementioned manner. Strictly
speaking, the strength of a particular desire can be measured by examining the behavior
of individuals who are subject to it. It is precisely this test for strength that underlies the
claim above: proponents of the global loss of autonomy conception argue their position
by highlighting the lengths to which addicts will go in order to procure drugs. Addicts
will engage, they suggest, in degrading and risky activities, including stealing and lying.
Moreover, addicts will spend time and effort not only in pursuit of drugs, but also in
attempts to stop consuming them. This latter endeavor indicates that, irrespective of
what else is true of them, addicts genuinely desire (on many occasions) to refrain from
acting on their addiction. However, though proponents of the global autonomy loss myth
are correct to hold that behavioral evidence unmistakably indicates that addicts have
impaired autonomy, addiction behaviors do not fit the profile expected when subject to
irresistible desires. Individuals with the capacity for voluntary action who are subject to
the irresistible desire to achieve a particular goal will pursue it across a broad range of
circumstances, realistic and unrealistic alike. Hence, only a countervailing incentive that is
itself of comparable power can limit or prevent the behavior (Levy 2012).
To be sure, the fact that an addict might refrain from using a drug in front of law
enforcement personnel is not evidence of a resistible desire; however, were the addict
to refrain for much smaller incentives – for instance, in order to spend money on food
(while not at risk of starvation), or in order to schedule it for a more convenient time
– this would mark resistible compulsion (Levy 2012). Contemporary evidence patently
demonstrates that addictive behavior is sensitive to incentives that are not extraordinary
in nature, and that it is not therefore subject to irresistible desires. Joanne Neale
(2002) has highlighted the affect of price on drug quantity consumed by addicts, and
52

DePergola
Herbert Fingarette (1988) reports that alcoholics exhibit sensitivity to cost even after
a priming drink. Moreover, when a powerful reason to abstain is personally accepted
and support is steadfastly provided throughout the withdrawal process, many addicts
succeed in overcoming their addiction. New mothers, for instance, are frequently able
to conquer their addiction in order to better care for their child. Gene Heyman (2009)
has emphasized that addicts can be treated through the constructive of positive and
negative behavioral incentives. Heyman draws heavily on the work of Stephen Higgins
and colleagues (1994), who have successfully used rewards (in the form of vouchers)
in the treatment of cocaine addiction. In a series of experiments, vouchers were paid to
addicts in return for clear urine tests, with the value of each voucher increasing over time
if the participant remained abstinent. The value of the vouchers did not exceed twelve
dollars in United States currency, and was sometimes significantly lower than this figure.
As Heyman notes, this is considerably less than the subjects were routinely spending on
cocaine, yet the treatment modality was effective in encouraging the majority to abstain
(Levy 2012).
The foregoing indications suggest that addicts are not subject to irresistible desires
that entail a global loss of autonomy. Some evidence suggests that individuals with
addiction may not be subject to desires to use drugs at all, at least on one understanding
of the nature of desire, according to which human beings requisitely have positive
attitudes toward desired objects (Levy 2012). Drugs may apparently be “wanted” – that
is, they may possess a high incentive salience – without being “liked” at all (Robinson and
Berridge 2003). David Balfour (2004) has identified the neural basis for this dissociation
between the causal strength of a desire and the liking of its object as a consequence of
the effects of dopamine on different regions of the NAc. One region is involved in the
subjective feelings of reward associated with the drug while the other confers incentive
salience on the stimulus independently of its being pleasurable. Heyman utilizes Balfour’s
study as a basis for claiming that addiction is a “disorder of choice” (Heyman 2009). By
this phrase, he indicates that (i) addiction is a syndrome in which choice is disordered,
but also that (ii) addiction is a syndrome in which dysfunctional behavior is chosen. At
least prima facie, this conclusion seems to imply that individuals ought to treat addictive
behaviors in the same way as other voluntary actions and hence to regard them as freely
chosen and morally irresponsible, worthy of condemnation and punishment. Although
Heyman’s line of thought is alluring, this essay rejects it as acutely shortsighted.
Autonomy manifests in degrees: it is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. An individual
may be capable of choice and suffer from diminished autonomy. While Heyman is
technically correct to hold that addicts choose to act as they do, he fails to recognize
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how severely impaired their autonomy to choose is. Addicts need not be in thrall to
anyone else, but it is clear that they fail to adequately govern themselves. Addicts
experience great difficulty in imposing their will on themselves, not in the manner that
myth proponents imagine (i.e., because they feel forced to act, against their will, by
overwhelming desires), but because although they may identify with their moment-tomoment choices, they cannot effectively pursue future plans and projects (Levy 2012).
Despite the fact that some individuals are more vulnerable to addiction than
others (as suggested by the high heritability of substance abuse disorders), modern
neuroscience has produced a substantial corpus of material on changes in the brain that
together suggest that the discount curves of addicts alter as a consequence of the chronic
use of addictive substances (Levy 2012). There is evidence that stimuli associated with
substances to which an individual is addicted are highly motivating in ways that bypass
capacities for conscious control. The motivational salience of a cue for the consumption
of any good seems to be encoded as, or caused by, a surge in dopamine from the VTA.
As individuals habituate toward a reward, this dopamine signal tends to attenuate. This
attenuation fails to occur with regard to drugs of addiction, which may explain why
their motivational salience increases even while the degree to which individuals prefer
the drug tends to fall. Dopamine causes a heightened focus on predictors of reward
and primes the motor system for action, leading to judgments that are difficult to revise
and behavior that is difficult to inhibit. While these mechanisms cause judgments and
behavior that would be strenuous for a well-functioning person to inhibit, addiction
causes neuroadaptations that weaken the efficacy of the frontal mechanisms that regulate
behavior. These neuroadaptations explain why addicts who sincerely wish to abstain
from drug use nevertheless find it extremely difficult to prevent positive responses to
drug-related cues. These neuroadaptations also explain the behavioral inconsistencies
characteristic of addiction. Work in social psychology has demonstrated the existence of
what may be a separate pathway whereby addicts find themselves oscillating between
preferring abstention and preferring consumption (Baumeister 2002). Research on
this phenomenon, known as “ego depletion,” suggests that cognitive resources that
individuals use to assess their options and inhibit prepotent responses are depletable.
Utilizing these faculties leaves fewer available for subsequent self-control tasks and,
hence, makes such tasks additionally cumbersome. In turn, ego depletion gives rise to the
oscillation in preferences observed in addiction: when self-control resources are plentiful,
the individual judges that abstention is best; when these resources are depleted, the
individual experiences a judgment shift in favor of consumption (Levy 2012).
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3.3. The Neuroethical Case Against LUMM:
The Normative Demands of Proportionate Reason
For reasons beyond the unsavory implications of biomedicalization and the myth
of global autonomy loss, this essay contends LUMM cannot be justified as a morally licit
biomedical practice within the confines of a comprehensive normative ethical framework.
The application of Richard McCormick’s (1985) threefold criteria of proportionate
reason can serve to illuminate the normative astigmatism of LUMM and the essay’s
corresponding endeavor to correct it. However, before an adequate moral assessment
of an action’s proportionality can be made, its effect on all ends and values must first be
weighed. Moral values can be considered and a final decision made only after all values
have been compared (Curran 1970). It is this systematic weighing of moral values, for
instance, that has made noncombatant immunity a virtually exceptionless moral rule. The
strength of moral norms touching concrete conduct is an elaboration of what is judged
– within a particular culture, with a particular history, based on a particular experience
– to be proportionate or disproportionate. Proportionality is always the criterion where
actions cause damage, and neurocognitive memory manipulation involves both personal
and social damage. The corrective vision provided herein attempts to halt the narrowlyconceived notion of proportionality embedded in the arguments of LUMM proponents
(McCormick 1985).
If there exist norms that are teleologically established and yet are virtually
exceptionless,4 the remaining task is to clarify the metaethical assertions in view of which
those norms are held as exceptionless. This task includes nondemonstrable calculations
– prudential judgments based on the certainties of history and the uncertainties of the
future. The sense of what individuals ought and ought not to do is therefore informed by
past experience and agnosticism with regard to future behavior and its long-term effects.
This suggests that where norms are viewed as virtually exceptionless, it is because of the
prudential validity technically referred to as lex lata in praesumptione periculi communis:
a law established on the presumption of common or universal danger (McCormick
1985). The notion of presumed universal danger is frequently associated with positive
law. That is, even if the action in question does not threaten the individual personally
(though LUMM does), there remains the further presumption that to allow individuals
to make that decision for themselves poses a threat to the common good (which LUMM
also does). Hence, the ethical impetus to retain autobiographically accurate, emotional
rational, and narratively authentic memories can be viewed in a way analogous to the
4.

For instance, the direct destruction of noncombatants in warfare.
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exceptionless character of norms such as noncombatant immunity. The risk in alternative
policies is simply too great. In the context of moral development, autobiographical,
emotional, and narrative memories are enormous goods at stake. Past experience of
human failure, inconsistency, and frailty, along with uncertainty regarding long-term
effects of such irreversible actions as dampening or erasing human memories, suggests
that societies should continue to hold some norms - such as authentic self-knowledge –
as virtually exceptionless. That is the conclusion of prudence in the face of dangers too
grave to make risk tolerable.
For McCormick, proportionate reason (for permitting the occurrence of harm
otherwise judged as illicit within a normative moral calculus) means three things: (i) the
value at stake is at least equal to the value being sacrificed; (ii) there is no less harmful
way to protect the value here and now; and (iii) the means used to protect the value
(here and now) will not undermine it in the long run (McCormick 1985). Conversely,
an action is disproportionate if (i) a lesser value is preferred to a more important one;
(ii) harm is unnecessarily caused in the protection of a greater good; or (iii) in the
circumstances, the manner of protecting the good will undermine it in the long run.
To determine if an action involving harm is proportionate in the circumstances, one
must judge whether the specific choice is the best possible service to all values in the
difficult and, in the context of PTSD and substance addiction, tragic circumstances. What
constitutes the best promotion of all values in the circumstances will, of course, depend
on how one defines and understands the circumstances. An adequate account of the
circumstances indicates not simply how much quantitative good can be salvaged from
an individual conflict of values, but also the weight and balance of social implications
and reverberating aftereffects insofar as they can be foreseen. This account will test
generalizability, consider cultural climate, draw from historical wisdom, seek guidance
from others, and distance itself from self-interested tendencies. In sum, the criterion
of proportionality is found within the ordo bonorum, which determines the good one
ought to do and serves as the objectively licit character of one’s activity. So informed and
organized, individuals do all that can be expected of them (McCormick 1985).
Before applying McCormick’s first criterion of proportionality – namely, that the
value at stake is at least equal to the value being sacrificed – to the action of LUMM
(McCormick 1985), it is necessary, first, to identify both the value at stake and the value
being sacrificed in the circumstances of LUMM. The strongest proponents of LUMM are
likely to define the value at stake as individual (and, in turn, social) health, well-being,
and safety (which has been compromised by disproportionate psychosocial conditions
including, but not limited to, PTSD and substance addiction). This essay defines the
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value being sacrificed as individual (and social) autobiographical memory, emotional
rationality, and narrative identity – elements that together comprise the ability to seek,
identify, and act on the good. There is no doubt that individual (and social) health, wellbeing, and safety are massively significant values. However, as LUMM proponents fail
to discern, these values depend almost exclusively for existence on some manifestation
of the interplay between memory, emotion, and identity. If overall health, well-being,
and safety are largely contingent on the capacities to understand (employing memory),
evaluate (employing emotion), and reason (employing identity), then LUMM does not
meet McCormick’s first criterion of proportionality. Indeed, the value at stake is not equal
to the value being scarified.
McCormick’s second criterion of proportionality requires that there exists no less
harmful way to protect the value here and now (McCormick 1985). Applied in the
context of LUMM, the criterion becomes thus: there exists no less harmful way to protect
the value of individual (and social) health, well-being, and safety than to annihilate
the memories that are presumed to be responsible for perpetuating disproportionate
psychosocial conditions (including, but not limited to, PTSD and substance addiction).
This claim is an enormous stretch, even in light of most aggressive and debilitating
psychosocial conditions. Moreover, it is based on the false premises that (i) memories
are solely or even primarily responsible for perpetuating psychosocial conditions, and
(ii) memories are independently and immutably morally charged. Neither of these
claims carry any neurobiological or neuroethical merit. Lastly, if the value being scarified
is defined as individual (and social) autobiographical memory, emotional rationality,
and narrative identity – elements that, again, collectively comprise the ability to seek,
identify, and act on the good – then it is difficult to imagine a more harmful way protect
the value here and now than to utilize LUMM to do so. In light of the abilities of intensive
psychotherapy and the proportionate use of rebalancing pharmacologicals (when utilized
to their fullest potential), 5 LUMM does not meet McCormick’s second criterion of
proportionality. Indeed, there exists a drastically less harmful (and impermanent) way to
protect the value here and now.
McCormick’s third criterion of proportionality requires that in the circumstances,
the means used to protect the value here and now will not undermine it in the long
run (McCormick 1985). Applied in the context of LUMM, the criterion becomes thus:
in the circumstances of threatening psychosocial conditions, the means of LUMM used
5.

This oversimplified statement is meant to include participation by those with addiction in the many
historically-successful 12-step recovery programs.
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(here and now) to protect the value of individual (and social) health, well-being, and
safety will not undermine it (i.e., individual [and social] health, well-being, and safety) in
the long run. Here, the neuroethical astigmatism of LUMM proponents is most acutely
evident. Proponents of LUMM frequently couch their arguments in what they believe
would result from the redemptive practice of LUMM: the restoration and reinstallation of
autonomy once plundered by debilitating and disproportionate psychosocial conditions.
By itself, the restoration and reinstallation of autonomy is a noble and desirable goal
for any treatment. As mentioned above, if the consequence of certain psychosocial
conditions involves the loss of autonomy, then the conditions(s) must be viewed to
somehow undercut the individual (and social) ability to pursue goals. This presumes,
however, that the pursuit of individual (and social) goals – which depends for existence
on the capacities to (i) recall (through memory) and (ii) act (through informed and
intentioned will) on them – will somehow be resurrected by annihilating the very
faculty (i.e., memory) that makes the pursuit possible and, more importantly, morally
responsible. However, goals are always specific; they cannot exist apart from individuals
and societies who espouse them, and they depend for definition, therefore, on the
characteristics those individuals and societies possess – characteristics that are, no doubt,
very different from other individuals and societies.
A standard understanding of autonomy refers to the freedom individuals (and
societies) ought to enjoy to choose their own way in life and to make their own decisions
within moral limits. Proponents of LUMM contend there is no more immediate and
humane way, in extreme circumstances, to restore and reinstate lost freedom than to
dampen or erase the memories that seem to imprison it. For them, LUMM marks a
bridge for individuals (and societies) bound by the devastating effects of psychosocial
disorders to once again be free to act freely. A first blush, this position is tempting and
intoxicating, but it ultimately proves astigmatic and impossible. Societies have long
nuanced the notion of pure autonomy to preclude the freedom of its members to simply
do as they wish. This is exemplified in the rejection, for instance, of strictly utilitarian
calculi and purely consequentialist logistics. Against the notion of pure autonomy, this
essay suggests that a more adequate understanding of autonomy is not fundamentally
concerned with the freedom to do as one wants, but with the freedom to do as one
ought in light of one’s moral responsibilities.
If this nuanced notion of autonomy is persuasive, then it raises the question of how
individuals can decipher what they have a moral responsibility to do. As the central
thesis of this essay holds, the answer is determined by one’s narrative identity, the sum
of one’s autobiographical memory and emotional rationality. The “autonomous ought”
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can therefore exist only in light of an idiosyncratic narrative. Hence, only within an
idiosyncratic narrative structure can one determine one’s future “oughtness” – the pull
of moral responsibility grounded in and determined by the story of one’s life and the
values and commitments that comprise it. Conceived of concretely, the “autonomous
ought” is what separates an individual’s lack of desire to help the child in front of her
from the responsibility to help the child in front of her because this child is her child
and she is this child’s parent. This structure of identity, which serves as the basis for
determining the good and one’s responsibility to act on it, is irreparably damaged by
memory manipulation, even in its most limited forms and exceptional applications. For
this reason, LUMM does not meet McCormick’s third criterion of proportionality. Indeed,
in the circumstances, the means used (here and now) to protect the value ultimately
undermine it in the long run.
Conclusion
This essay has offered a critical response to proponents of LUMM. Part 1 examined
LUMM for PTSD, and included a specific analysis of the neurobiology of PTSD and betaadrenergic receptor-blocking pharmacologicals as treatment for the disorder. It concluded
by identifying the strongest possible case in favor of LUMM for PTSD. Part 2 explored
LUMM for substance addition, and included a specific analysis of the neurobiology of
substance addiction and DBS and FMC as treatments for the disease. It concluded by
proffering the strongest possible case in favor of LUMM for substance addiction. Finally,
Part 3 evaluated the neuroethical astigmatism of LUMM, and included a specific analysis
of biomedicalization and the codification of new diseases, as well as the myth of global
autonomy loss. It concluded by proposing that LUMM violates the normative demands
of proportionate reason.
The evidence provided in this essay supports the conclusion that interventions to
dampen, disassociate, erase, and replace episodic memories of trauma and addiction
ultimately undermine one’s ability to seek, identify, and act on the good. As such,
memory manipulation, even in its most limited forms, cannot be ethically justified as a
licit medical practice.
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